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The Extent and Delimitation of
Territorial Waters
HE-NRY S. Fn.AsE*
It is not too much to say that the confused condition of the law of
territorial waters has for years hampered commerce, delayed and
impaired the administration of justice, and endangered international
political relations. The confusion, however, in the law on this
subject is partially due to inherent difficulties and honest differences
of opinion, and not to any lack of attempts on the part of courts and
publicists to establish the true bases of the law, or on the part of
international societies to draft codes in the interest of uniformity.
In fact, at the present time an ambitious attempt to bring order out
of the chaos in the law of territorial waters is being made by the Com-
mittee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International
Law. This Committee of sixteen experts was appointed by the
Council of the League of Nations on December 12, 1924, and is
composed of a group of eminent jurisconsults not only possessing
individually the required qualifications but also as a body represent-
ing the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of
the world. The Committee held its first session in April, 1925, and
at that time appointed twelve sub-committees to make a preliminary
examination of certain questions of public and private international
law, with a view to more detailed propositions at a later date. Among
the subjects chosen for study was the problem of territorial waters,
which topic was given into the hands of Dr. Walther Schifcking
(Germany), M. Barboza de Magalhaes (Portugal), and Mr. George W.
Wickersham (United States).
In January, 1926, the Committee of Experts convened at Geneva
for their second session, and took up one by one the reports of the
several sub-committees. It was decided, among other things, to
submit a draft convention on the law of territorial waters to the
governments of the world, whether members of the League or not,
for the purpose of receiving criticisms and suggestions to enable the
Committee to continue its work in a practical fashion. In sending
the report to the governments, it was requested that their replies be
returned not later than October 15, 1926, in time for the third session
of the Committee of Experts. The Committee will then report to
the Council of the League of Nations whether the time is ripe for an
*Senior in Cornell Law School.
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international conference to draw up a definitive convention on
territorial waters.' In view, therefore, of the present situation and
the vast possibilities of the immediate future, this article is written,
with the earnest hope that it may contribute a very little to the
solution of certain difficulties.
I. THE EXTENT OF TERRITORIAL WATERS
In this section we shall not be concerned with the precise extent of
territorial waters under all the varied geographical conditions of the
shore-line, which will be the subject of investigation in the second
half of this article, but rather with the limit of the marginal sea on the
open coast, whether three, four, six, etc., miles. The discussion of the
general limit must precede that of the methods of measurement,
because the latter depends upon the former. For the present, there-
fore, no special attention will be given to bays, straits, and islands;
and account will be taken only of the historical evolution and present
status of the general limits of the marginal sea.2
The practice of nations in respect to the extent of territorial waters,
both in the past and in the present, has widely varied. One country
will claim three miles, another four miles, another six miles, while
virtually all exercise jurisdiction for particular purposes, as neutrality
and customs, well beyond the bounds of the sea claimed to be
territorial.3 This confusion of national usages quite evidently hinders
beneficial economic intercourse among the states, to say nothing of
the ill-feeling frequently caused in diplomatic circles when one state
has exceeded what another state conceives to be the reasonable rule.
If England regards three miles as the limit on her shores, she will not
willingly acquiesce in a claim of six miles on the part of Spain. A
confusion of laws on such a vital point of world-wide significance has
led, and still leads, to dangerous friction. There would seem little
reason why uniformity could not be achieved in this field, to the
great advantage of the administration of the law, of maritime com-
merce, and of international good-will.
Uniformity need not, and should not, take the form of a universal,
fixed limit for all purposes. What requires to be done, it would seem,
is first to fix a limit to the marginal sea, binding throughout the world
'See article in this issue of the CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY by the Hon. George W.
Wickersham.2For an exhaustive and scholarly study of the history of the territorial sea, the
reader is referred to Thomas W. Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea. Edinburgh and
London, 19ri. See also note by Henry P. Farnham in 46 L. R. A. 264. An
admirable treatise on all phases of the subject was recently published by the late
Paul Fauchille, Tras6 de droit international public, Vol. I, Pt. 2, Peace. Paris,
1925.ZSee Rodriguez Martin, Mares Territoriales, pp. 13 et sgq.
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and carrying with it, in favor of the littoral state, all powers of sover-
eignty (subject always to the right of innocent passage), and secondly
to fix a number of maximum limits beyond that, likewise binding all
nations, up to which a state, if it chose, might exercise jurisdiction for
the three or four special purposes for which each of the said maximum
limits would be provided. History has shown that states must
exercise some powers of jurisdiction beyond the narrow limits of the
marginal belt proper, especially for customs and neutrality require-
ments.4 On the other hand, the nations will hardly consent to en-
larging the marginal sea, with all its far-reaching powers of sov-
ereignty, beyond three miles; and, in fact, the Committee of Experts
has agreed in the tentative draft convention upon three marine miles
of sixty to the degree of latitude.
The advantage of a system of maxima for the few purposes where
history has demonstrated the necessity of a jurisdiction wider than
three miles, would lie in the privilege of each state to choose its own
customs or neutral limit to meet its own peculiar local requirements,
always, of course, keeping within the maximum allowed in each
case for such jurisdiction. Thus, for example, if some country did
not wish to assume the obligations of a neutral to the full maximum
distance allowed, this method would permit it to proclaim some
more modest limit within the maximum., To go one detail further, it
might be feasible to require each nation to give international notifi-
cation of the several distances it elected to go within the various
maxima, by filing copies of its legislation with the Secretary of the
League of Nations, otherwise the limit of the marginal sea to be
presumed in favor of or against it.
It will be useful briefly to survey the history of the various limits
employed by different nations. Let us first consider the three-mile
limit. This well-known limit is the outgrowth of a theory of sov-
ereignty based on the range of cannon, which theory first gained
attention in the early seventeenth century, namely in 16lo, when it
was proposed by a Dutch embassy in London. It was not, however,
accepted by the British at that time, nor very seriously discussed.6
4This has been effected sometimes by treaty, but more often by unilateral
legislation.5This system would be in harmony with the liberal practice of certain nations
in permitting foreigners to fish in territorial waters. Finland and the Soviet
Republic fish in each other's territorial waters in the Arctic Ocean, with certain
exceptions. See Convention signed at Helsingfors, Oct. 21, 1922. League of
Nations, Treaty Series, XXIX, 2o5-2o9. The territorial waters of the Archipelago
of Spitzbergen are open for fishing to the United States, the British Empire,
Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Treaty
signed at Paris, Feb. 9, 1920. Ibid., II, 8-ig.6Fulton, op. cit., pp. 155-159.
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The theory was again referred to in 1625 by Grotius in somewhat
ambiguous language,7 and again in 1639 by Gerbier, the British
agent at Brussels, who wrote that the Hollanders "cannot acknowl-
edge His Majesty to have any further jurisdiction on the seas than
within reach of cannon shot."'8
In 1703, Cornelius van Bynkershoek succeeded in giving the theory
of cannon-range widespread publicity. This eminent Dutch jurist
crystallized the idea in an aphoristic form that gained the ears of
statesmen-"potestatem terrae finiri, ubi finitur armorum vis."9
This phrase became a potent watchword and has been quoted by
publicists ever since.. In this way, while not by any means originat-
ing the theory of cannon-range, Bynkershoek gave it an international
standing.
The next step was to express the theory in practical form, that is, in
terfs of miles. This was the contribution of Fernando Galiani,
Sicilian Secretary of Legation at Paris, who wrote a work in 1782 in
which three miles were first fixed upon as the equivalent of the range
of cannon.' 0 The three-mile limit gained considerably more headway
about a decade later, when the United States tentatively adopted
"'one sea league or three geographical miles" to serve as the zone in
which the United States would enforce her rights as a neutral in the
war between England and France." From this time on, the three-
mile limit gradually won acceptance elsewhere, for example, in Eng-
land during the early years of the nineteenth century by means of
certain decisions of Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell)."
The first ratified treaty adopting the three-mile limit came in 1818,
7
"Videtur autem imperium in maris portionem eadem ratione acquiri, qua
eria alia, id est, ut supra diximus, ratione personarum et ratione territorii.
tione personarum, ut si classis, qui maritimus est exercitus, aliquo in loco
maris se habeat: ratione territorii, quatenus ex terra cogi possunt, qui in proxima
maris parte versantur, nec minus quam si in ipsa terra reperirentur." De Jure
Belli ac Pacis, Lib. II, Cap. III, § XIII, 2.8R. G. Marsden, Ed., Documents Relating to Law and Custom of the Sea, 1, 487
note. (Publications of the Navy Records Society, Vol. XLIX.)9De Dominio Maris, Cap. II.
'
0 He was followed by Azuni in 1795. Fulton, pp. 563, 564-565. Arnold Raestad,
La mer territoriale, pp. 124-125.
"Jefferson's letter reads in part as follows: "Reserving, however, the ultimate
extent of this for future deliberation, the President gives instructions to the
officers acting under his authority to consider those heretofore given them as
restrained for the present to the distance of one sea league or three geographical
miles from the seashores." Jefferson to Hammond, Nov. 8, 1793- J. B. Moore,
A Digest of International Law, I, 702-703. A geographical mile is the same as a
marine, sea, nautical, or Admiralty mile.
12The Twee Gebroeders, Alberts, master, 3 C. Rob. 162 (18oo); The Anna,
5 C. Rob. 373 (18o5). But the earlier claims of England to extensive portions of
the seas died hard, and it was not until the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of
1878 that the shroud was finally drawn around Selden's pretensions. See Fulton,
p. 580 note.
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between the United States and Great Britain in regard to their re-
spective fishing rights in North America.1 3 Many other countries
now began to follow the Anglo-American lead and to recognize three
miles as a reasonable limit for many purposes: France by treaty with
England in 1839;14 Austria by decree in 1846;15 Germany by treaty
with England in 1868;16 Greece in I869;17 Russia in 1869 and 1893,8
(but lately Russia has fixed on four miles in the Gulf of Finland, with
certain exceptions, by the Treaty of Peace of Dorpat between Finland
and Russia, October 14, 1920);" Japan in 187o;20 Belgium and
Holland by the North Sea Fishery Convention of 1882 ;21 Portugal
by statute in I9O9 ; Chile by decree in i914; the British colonies; 24
etc.2
Individual governments have not been the only agents in the
progress of the three-mile rule. At least two famous international
arbitral tribunals have been guided by the three-mile limit, namely,
in the matter of the seal controversy in Behring Sea, and in the
matter of the North Atlantic coast fisheries in i91o. It is to be
observed, however, that the parties to these arbitrations were the
United States and Great Britain, both of whichPowers had pre-
viously adhered to the three-mile rule.28
Not all states, however, have welcomed the three-mile doctrine.
For example, Norway and Sweden have long maintained a wider
13Fulton, p. 581.
4Henry G. Crocker, Compiler, The Extent of the Marginal Sea, p. 524.
15Fulton, pp. 658-659.
"Crocker, p. 555.
17Fulton, p. 661.
18Crocker, pp. 62o-621.
"Text in League of Nations, Treaty Series, III, i-iS. See also aworkpub-
lished last year, but to which I have not had access, by S. R. Bj6rksten, Das
Wassergebiet Finniands in valkerrechtlicher Hinsicht. Helsingfors, 1925.
20Proclamation of neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War. Crocker,
Spp. 603-604. Japan and Russia, in 1911, together with Great Britain and the
United States, agreed not to allow their subjects or vessels to kill, capture, or
pursue sea otters beyond the distance of three miles from the shore-line of their
respective Pacific coasts north of the thirtieth parallel of north latitude. The
Statutes at Large of the United States of America, Vol. 37, Part 2, p. 1543.2
'Crocker, p. 486.
2Ibid., p. 619.
"Ibid., pp. 512-513.24Fulton, p. 661.
"See also, Arnold Raestad:"Tableau des lois et r gles actuellement en vigueur
dansles pays d'Europe et aux Atats-Unis d'Am~rique en ce qui concerne l'dtendue
de la mer territoriale," Revue ggnirale de droit international public, 21:401-420(1914). A valuable summary may also be found in Paul Fauchille, op. cit.,
pp. 179-183.
21This limit has recently been given renewed sanction by general declarations in
liquor treaties between the United States and Great Britain (May 22, 1924);
and Germany (August II, 1924); and Panama (January I9, 1925); and the
Netherlands (April 8, 1925).
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limit, supporting their claims from history. It will not be out of place
to examine these Scandinavian claims rather closely.
The true reason for the larger claim of Norway is the fishing ad-
vantage thereby gained. Norway is essentially a maritime country,
only a very small part of the land being under cultivation. Fisheries
'have always constituted one of the chief industries. The greatest
cod fishing in Europe is carried on annually off the coast of Norway.
Hence, the importance to her of reserving as much of the adjacent
seas as possible for the exclusive enjoyment of the local fishermen.
As early as 1747, long before the three-mile limit had come into
vegue, Norway by a'royal rescript fixed four miles as the extent of the
national fishing monopoly.2 7 This distance was expressed in the
rescript as one Norwegian mile, or sea-league, which was later de-
fined (1759) as a marine league, of which there are fifteen to a degree.
Thus a Norwegian marine league is made to equal about four English
marine or geographical miles, of which there are sixty to a degree.
In this way the four-mile limit came into use in Norway, and has
never been withdrawn as to exclusive fishing rights, despite occasional
objections from foreign governments. 8
As Fulton points out,29 the fact that the Norwegian claim has been
respected, for the most part, by foreign Powers is probably owing to
the infrequent visits of foreign fishing vessels to the coast of Norway.30
But there is no assurance that such conditions will continue in-
2 7Thorvald B6ye, "Territorial Waters. With Special Reference to Norwegian
Legislation," International LawAssociation, Stockholm Conference, 1924, pp. 302,
318. L.M.B.Aubert, "La mer territoriale de la Norvbge," Revue ginirale de droit
international public, 1:429-441, at p. 432 (1894).
28This is perhaps the place to note very briefly the problem of the delimitation
of territorial waters off Norway. Studded with islets and rocks, the precipitous
Norwegian coast presents a special and interesting case. The government of that
country was early faced with a very practical situation-shall these numerous
archipelagos, seemingly designed by nature to constitute part of the coast itself,
be considered as an appendant portion thereof, and the territorial sea consequently
measured from the outermost isles and rocks? National advantage dictated an
affirmative answer, which was in fact given by royal decree in 1812, and it isto
this decree that the present Scandinavian method of delimitingterritorialwaters
may betraced. This method consists of drawing a base line from one outermost
island to another, even where the ordinary territorial zones surrounding thesaid
islands would not intersect each other; in other words, between islands whether
or not they are more than eight marine miles apart. Landward of this base line
all the sea is territorial, as is also the ocean for four marine miles seaward there-
from. The territoriality of the fjords is determined in like arbitrary fashion. The
government, supporting its decrees from history and long usage, reserves exclusive
fishery rights for its nationals in whatever fjords it chooses, almost regardless of
extent or configuration. See further, Romde de Villeneuve, De la determination
de la ligne s6parative des eaux nationales et de la mer territoriale spcialement dans
les baies, pp. 185-195.
2 9Pp. 677-680.30The same fact was commented upon in 1870 by the Minister of the Interior
in Norway. Fulton, p. 678.
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definitely. Moreover, Norway's peculiar method of delimiting
territorial waters, by taking as a base a line connecting the outermost
islands, thereby marking off wholesale tracts of the sea, constitutes
an aggravation of a condition already pregnant with the danger of
international discord.
Despite Norway's claims, and her refusal to join in the North Sea
Fishery Convention of 1882, the World War demonstrated that she
would yield a point when it came to matters of neutrality. In May,
xgT8, Norway informed England that she recognized the difficulty of
maintaining her point of view as to neutral rights and duties when
such view was not shared either by England or Germany. Conse-
quently, Norway restricted her neutral zone to three miles.31 As to
fishing, however, the ancient claims are still maintained.2
The claim of Sweden to four miles has had a different development.
It has been argued with some reason by Baron de Stall-Holstein that
the Swedish limit in the middle of the eighteenth century was three
French or English geographical miles.3 However that may be, a
change of some kind was intended shortly thereafter by naval
instructions to the effect that the national domain extended to a
German mile. But as Baron de Stall-Holstein asserts, this only
confused the situation, since a German mile was not a maritime
measure. All doubts were cleared away, however, in 1788 when the
distance was fixed at one marine league or one-fifteenth of a degree3
This is the Scandinavian. marine league, which is equal to four
English or French marine miles. Thus, in 1788, Sweden first made
an unequivocal claim to four miles, and confirmed it later by certain
prize regulations (i8o8).11
It is important to note that the above Swedish decrees and regu-
lations were solely for purposes of neutrality, and did not apply to
fishing rights. Not until 1871 was the four-mile fishing limit, which in
Norway dated from 1747, embodied in Swedish legislation.3 Even
31Dr. J. Paulus, "La mer territoriale," Revue de droit international et de legislation
compar&e, 51:397-424, at pp. 407-4o8 (1924). See also note, "TheThree-Mile
Limit as a Rule of International Law," 23 Columbia Law Review, 472-476, atp. 475,
note 46 (1923). In 1915, the German Supreme Prize Court of Berlin refused to
recognize Norwegian neutral waters beyond three miles. Case of the Gifion,
June i8, i915. Paul Fauchille et Charles de Visscher, La Guerre de 1914. Juris-
prudence allemande en mati re de prises maritimes. Dicisions de la cour supreme
de Berlin, p. 16. A like decision was made in regard to Swedish neutral waters in
the case of the ElEida, May i8, 1915. Ibid., p. 8.32See further, Baron L. de StacI-Holstein, "Le r6gime scandinave des eaux
littorales," Revue de droit international et de lgislation compare, 51:63o-679
(1924).
nResolution of the King, Aug. 7, 1758. Ibid., pp. 636, 646.
21Crocker, p. 627.
35Ibid., p. 627.36Baron L. de Staal-Holstein, article cited, pp. 65o-653.
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then the law applied only to that portion of the coast north of the
Sound.37  The same limit was subsequently carried through the
Sound and up to Simrishamn by the treaty of July i4, 1899, with
Denmark,38 but in regard to the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Bothnia,
no fishery decree appears to have been issued. Lundberg and Berlin
allege that the three-mile limit is understood, but Reuterskjbld de-
clares that the decree of i871 of four miles applies by analogy to the
whole coast of Sweden. 9
The third European Power that lays claim to more than three miles
for most, if not all, purposes is Spain. Here a six-mile limit is asserted,
although not always enforced. Spain's claim is based on a Real
C6dula of December i7, i76o, and is supported by a royal decision in
1775, and royal decrees in i83o and 1852. Six miles constituted the
minimum limit for all purposes, a greater distance being enforced
against certain states in accordance with the terms of treaties.4 0
The decrees of Spain have not gone unchallenged by other Powers.
The United States has more than once informed Spain that no greater
limit than three miles would be recognized. 4' Great Britain likewise
has "always uniformly and strenuously resisted the pretensions of the
Spanish Government to exercise jurisdiction at a greater distance
than one league, or three nautical miles, from the Spanish coast
seawards, or within bays of the Spanish shore." 4'
Despite this opposition Spain has clung to her original claim. On
the other hand, the six-mile limit does not appear to be rigidly en-
forced everywhere on her coasts or equally against all nations. Ac-
cording to Professor A. F. Marion, the three-mile limit, instead of the
six-mile, is applied in practice against French fishermen in the Medi-
terranean.43 Likewise some years ago British and German trawlers
developed an extensive fishery up to three miles off the Atlantic
SThe decree of May 5, 1871 reserved for nationals the fishery in the waters
between the Kullen Light in Scania and the Swedish-Norwegian boundary within
the limit of one geographical mile (i. e., one Swedish league equal to four French
or English geographical miles of sixty to a degree). Crocker, p. 627; Fulton, p.
674.64Fulton, pp. 674-675.
39Baron L. de Sta~l-Holstein, p. 659.
4°Fulton, p. 569; Crocker, pp. 622-626.
"In 1856 in the case of the El Dorado; in 1862 and 1863 in the case of the
Blanche; in 1870 in the case of the Colonel Lloyd Aspinwall; in i88o-8i in the
cases of the Ethel A. Merritt, Eunice P. Newcomb, George Washington, and Hattie
Haskell; and indirectly, in 1875, by a note to the British government. J. B.
Moore, A Digest of International Law, I, 7o6-714. Francis Wharton, A Digest
of the International Law of the United States, 2nd ed., I, lO2-1o9.
42Lord Derby to Mr. Watson, Sept. 25, 1874. British and Foreign State Papers,
LXX, 186-187.
"Letter to Mr. Fulton, p. 667 of the latter's work.
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coast, in the face, however, of strong opposition from the local
fishermen. 44
Perhaps the only other European country necessary to mention as
a special case is Italy. The position of Italy regarding the three-
mile limit is doubtful. Paragraph 14 ol her rules of internationak-
maritime law issued in 19o8 for the use of the navy declares that
territorial waters for purposes of the law of war have the extent of
cannon-range from shore, and that the said extent, by customary
law, must be held to be fixed at three marine miles, beginning at low-
water mark.41 In 1914, however, only six years later, Italy by law
established her territorial sea for purposes of neutrality atsixmarine
miles from the shore.4
The larger claims of Norway, Sweden, Spain, and other Powers,
and the fact that most nations exercise certain forms of jurisdiction
beyond three miles, have led the aforementioned Committee of
Experts to propose a sort of *compromise. Article 2 of the draft
convention, now before the governments of the world for suggestion
and criticism, reads as follows:
The zone of the coastal sea shall extend for three marine miles
(6o to the degree of latitude) from low-water mark along the
whole extent of the coast. Beyond the zone of sovereignty,
States may exercise administrative rights on the ground either
of custom or of vital necessity. There are included the rights of
jurisdiction necessary for their protection. Outside the zone of
sovereignty no right of exclusive economic enjoyment may be
exercised.
Exclusive rights to fisheries continue to be governed by exist-
ing practice and conventions.47
"Fulton, pp. 667-668.
45Crocker, p. 6ol. Certain Italian courts (Genoa, Sarzana, and Naples) have
adopted the range of cannon as the measure of the territorial sea. Paul Fauchille,
TraitM de droit international public, Vol. I, Pt. 2, Peace, p. 183.46Gazzelta Uficiale, Aug. I6, 1914. But Italy was not alone in 1914 in proclaim-
ing waters beyond three miles as neutral. Greece proclaimed a zone of six miles,
Uruguay five miles, Ecuador four naval leagues. See note, 23 Columbia Law
Review, 472-476 (1923). French neutral waters were carried to six miles in
certain places on the coast. See decree in Journal officiel de la RMpubligue
Franqaise, Aug. 9, 1914, p. 7285. Paul Fauchille, La Guerre de x94. Jurispru-
dence francaise en mati~re de prises maritimes, Annexe, p. xxiii.4VFrench text: "La zone de la mer ctire s'6tend A 3 milles marins (60 au
degr6 de la latitude) de la laisse de basse-marde sur toute l'dtendue des cates.
Au-de& de la zone de domination, les Etats peuvent exercer des droits adminis-
tratifs, en se basant, ou sur les usages, ou sur un besoinessentiel. Sontinclusles
droits de juridiction n~cessaires h leur protection. Au-del:. de la zone de domina-
tion, les droits de jouissance dconomique exclusive ne peuvent pas 8tre exerc~s.
"Les droits exclusifs de peche demeurent soumis aux pratiques et conventions
existantes."
I have not yet seen the official printed French text; the above and following
French quotations from the draft convention are taken from a typewritten copy
brought from Geneva.
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It is submitted that this article may be improved in several essen-
tial particulars. In the first place, low-water mark is not the same at
all times, and it would perhaps be advisable expressly to incorporate
the rule of an ordinary neap tide, which is taken as the base in English
law.4 8
In the second place, no definite limit whatever is placed on the
second zone beyond the three-mile zone of sovereignty. The only
guides in this outer zone are to be "custom" and "vital necessity."
But these criteria do not tend to unify the general law of territorial
waters, which is the great object of the Committee of Experts, and the
great need of the maritime world. Moreover, vital necessity seems a
dangerous term inviting abuse. If by vital necessity is meant necessity
as conceived unilaterally by the littoral state, then there will be no
end of trouble, and the problem of territorial waters will still remain a
thorn in the international flesh. Furthermore, the term "vital
necessity" seems superfluous, because a nation always has the right of
self-defense, and in a true emergency may exceed ordinary bounds
without offending against international law. Under Article 2 as it
now stands, what is there to prevent a state from legislating in its
own interests, and to the detriment of other states, under the cloak of
vital necessity? In such a contingency, from which side ought a
court of arbitration to view the necessity?
Is not the solution to be found in a maximum beyond which no
state may legislate? If it is feared that the fixing of maximum limits
outside of the three-mile zone for customs and neutral purposes would
result in an undesirable inelasticity in the law, it may be answered
that when a genuine need is felt in the future for an extension of a
given maximum, the matter may readily be handled by special
treaties, or the draft convention itself may be amended. In the mean-
time, certainty in law will have afforded comfort to commerce.49
Finally, a latent inconsistency is present in the last two sentences
of the Article, one forbidding exclusive economic enjoyment beyond
three miles, and the other leaving fishery privileges to be governed by
existing practice and conventions. The inconsistency arises from the
fact that certain countries at the present time exclude foreigners from
the coastal fisheries for more than a distance of three miles from the
4"Fulton, p. 641.
49Dr. Louis Franck, President of the International Maritime Committee, in
summarizing the results of its work, recently wrote: "There is a first result, the
importance of which cannot be put too high. It is that in all countries the bulk
of shipowners, underwriters, merchants, bankers, and maritime lawyers are
practically unanimous in the opinion that an international law for the sea is
required by modern commerce." Dr. Louis Franck, "A New Law for the Seas,"
42 Law Quarterly Review, 25-36, at p. 28 (1926).
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shore. If it be the present intention of the Committee of Experts to
postpone the complex fishery problem, it would seem preferable to
qualify the absolute tenor of the last sentence of the first paragraph,
thus avoiding the sharp conflict with the closing sentence of the
Article.
I. THE DELIMITATION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS
The problem of the delimitation of the marine zone is highly
technical, but it must be faced and pursued to the end, for upon its
proper solution will depend in large measure the success of any con-
vention or future treaty. To obtain any degree of uniformity in the
law on this subject by attempting to restate customary law is im-
possible, because of the very absence of authoritative customarylaw
due to widely divergent national practices. It would seem that uni-
formity in this important field could be attained in many instances
only through sheer legislation by way of international convention.
The first question concerns the necessity of some limit that is
definite. At least one writer has expressed the opinion that it is
unnecessary to have any fixed width, that it is merely a matter of
reasonable "protective jurisdiction. '" 5 This writer maintains that
the "validity of the principle of 'control from land' should be main-
tained irrespective of the precise manner in which it may be applied.
Nations ivill naturally strive to exercise their right of jurisdiction in a
manner that will not adversely affect the legitimate interests of
other nations. If by any chance they should abuse the right, they
must expect, as in all other fields of international relations, to make
proper redress. If any nation, on the other hand, under the cloak of
vindicating the principle of freedom of the seas, should abet its
nationals in dubious transactions resulting in the violation of the
laws of another nation, it would be guilty of an unfriendly act which
is not merely to be deplored but to be vigorously resented at times.
In view of the fact, however, that this right of 'protective jurisdiction,'
like the freedom of the seas, is of mutual and vital concern to all
nations, it is not to be expected that it will either be exercised rashly
or challenged in a captious spirit."
The above doctrine appears charged with danger. Every extension
by one state would serve as the signal for a universal extension.
Moreover, the author fails to take into account upon what pre-
scribed basis a nation shall make complaint to another. A municipal
5°Philip Marshall Brown, "The Marginal Sea," Editorial, I7 American Journal
of International Law, 89-95 (1923). See also, same author, "Protective Juris-
diction over Marginal Waters," Proceedings of the American Society of International
Law, 1923, pp. 15-31, and discussion, pp. 40-47.
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law may seem reasonable to one nation and most unreasonable to
the nation against which the law may operate. If the dispute should
go to arbitration, it would be difficult under this doctrine of general
protective jurisdiction to determine from which side to view the
question of reasonableness. The strongest argument against this
doctrine is that historically the three-mile limit has progressively
gained favor. It was not by mere chance that a fixed limit was set,
but because a definite limit was felt imperative.
If the territorial sea is to be measured, the next problem concerns
the standard of measurement, whether ballistic, visual, geograph-
ical, etc.
As was indicated in the foregoing section, cannon-range provided
an early standard. But this proved too vague in practice, and by the
close of the eighteenth century, a definite number of marine miles
was substituted as an equivalent. The theory of cannon-range has of
late fallen into desuetude, although its ghost occasionally walks."
If this theory were literally followed to-day, the results would not be
tolerated by a single great Power. First, the limit would be increased
far beyond what any nation claims, for modem cannon carry twenty
miles and more. Second, the limit would vary with the progress of
ballistics, and the invention of a new gun in Germany in the month of
March would determine whether a Japanese fishing vessel was in
Chinese territorial waters in April. Third, enormous tracts of the
sea would be reserved to national fishermen, out of all proportion to
their needs. Fourth, since the low-water mark is taken as the base
line, and cannon could not be placed on the land between the tides,
the rule would result in a physical impossibility. Fifth, the juris-
diction of coastal states for police purposes would be extended to an
unwonted degree. Sixth, the obligations of neutral states would be
much greater than they ever have been in the past. Seventh, the
freedom of the seas, as generally understood, would be radically
curtailed.52
5'Professor Stoerk declares that it is time to do away with "die aus der Barock-
zeit stammende Formel Bynkershoeck's, der eben alles fehlt, was von einerjuristischen Norm gefordert werden muss: Schdrfe und regulatorische Kraft far
jeden einzelnen Fall des wechselvollen Lebens." Professor Stoerk in F. Holtzen-
dorff, Handbuch des V61kerrechts, II, 478. IUon Pdzeril, on the other hand, stands
out for cannon-range. Des navires de commerce frangais dans les eaux &rang~res,
pp. 121-128.
62For criticism of the theory of cannon-range, see Arnold Raestad, La mer
territoriale, Ch. XI. Sir Thomas Barclay in his report to the Institut de Droit
International in 1894 asserted that for fishing purposes the range of guns is not
acceptable. "It implies a vast and vague distance of jurisdiction with which no
State could desire to charge itself and which, probably, no neighboring States
would admit in case of conflict." See also note, 23 Michigan Law Review,
163-166, at p. 166 (1924).
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If vision is taken as the standard, equal difficulties are encountered.
The old "land-kenning" was fixed at fourteen miles, and although this
is less than the range of modem guns, it is more than any nation now
claims. Whatever may be the merits of vision in dealing with terri-
torial bays,ss it clearly is an unsatisfactory norm for the open coast."
It is too variable, depending on the position of the observer, the
weather conditions, the keenness of the eye, etc."s
A third method of measuring the territorial sea is by the distance a
vessel can traverse in a given time. This method, a most ancient
one,56 has been adopted in the recent liquor treaties negotiated by the
United States. 7 It might well be questioned, however, whether this
rule, whatever its value against rum runners, would be a good or
practical one if applied to other purposes.
The fourth method, and the one in almost universal modem use, is
geographical. This would seem to meet the practical need for definite-
ness.
If, then, the standard of measurement is to be geographical, how
shall it be applied? The first question pertains to high and low-
nDunham v. Lamphere, 3 Gray (Mass.) 268 (1855). Regina v. Cunningham,
Bell's Crown Cases 72 (1859).
"Two fairly recent authors, however, favor the range of vision. Paul Godey,
La mer c6tire, pp. 19 ff. Paris, 1896. Robert David, La pclhe maritime au point
de vue international, pp. 19, 31. Paris, 1897.
5See Bynkershoek, De Dominio Maris, and Fulton, p. 546.
"It was proposed by Bartolus of Saxo-Ferrato and Baldus Ubaldus in the
fourteenth century. Fulton, pp. 539-540. See also, Walther Schficking, Das
Kistenmeer im internationalen Rechte, pp. 6-7.57Paragraph (3) of Article II of the Convention between the United States and
Great Britain for prevention of smuggling of intoxicating liquors (proclaimed
May 22, 1924) reads as follows: "The rights conferred by this article shall not be
exercised at a greater distance from the coast of the United States its territories
or possessions than can be traversed in one hour by the vessel suspected of
endeavoring to commit the offense. In cases, however, in which the liquor is
intended to be conveyed to the United States its territories or possessions by a
vessel other than the one boarded and searched, it shall be the speed of such other
vessel and not the speed of the vessel boarded, which shall determine the dis-
tance from the coast at which the right under this article can be exercised."
The Statutes at Large of the United States of America, Vol. 43, Part 2, p. 1762.
The recent decisions under this and similar treaties may be classed under two
main heads; first, those decisions grounded on the theory that the treaties extend
the territorial waters of the United States to one hour's travel as to the liquor
laden vessels, and therefore aitthorize their seizure; and second, those decisions
resting on the theory that the transshipment of liquor beyond four leagues is not
forbidden by the Tariff Act of 1922, and that, such transshipment not being made
illegal by the treaties, no American municipal law forbids unlading if performed
beyond four leagues. To the first group of decisions belong The Pictonian,
3 F. (2d) 145 (1924) and United States v. Henning, 7 F. (2d) 488 (1925). To
the second group belong The Over the Top, 5 F. (2d) 838 (1925); The Panama,
6 F. (2d) 326 (1925); and the recent opinion (April, 1926) of Hough, C. J., in the
case of the United States v. The Sagatind and The Diamantina (Circuit Court of
Appeals).
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water mark. In modem times the latter is regarded as the base line,"'
and when a statute or a treaty refers to the "sinuosities of the coast,"
the sinuosities at low tide are meant. The Committee of Experts has
wisely incorporated in Article 2 of the draft convention, quoted
above, this almost universal rule of low-water mark.
A contentious problem arises in regard to islands, shoals, banks,
and rocks. At one time it was doubted that small islands possessed
any maritime belt, at least for purposes other than neutral rights.59
But it would now seem that islands stand on the same basis as the
mainland. 0 A difficulty in administering any other rule would lie in
the great difference in size of various islands. If Australia, Cuba,
and Porto Rico are allowed territorial seas, at what point would an
island become too small to merit one ?61 The chief difficulty, however,
does not concern islands, but shoals, banks, and rocks. Strictly
speaking, shoals and banks are invisible, this fact distinguishing them
from islands. But if at low-water of an ordinary neap tide they are
left dry, a question at once arises whether they are entitled to rank
with islands. Formerly, courts hesitated to accord territorial sig-
nificance to such banks and shoals,62 but modem practice has been
58But an ordinance of Argentine in 1907 declared that in respect to fisheries,
the water up to ten miles from high-water mark on land is under state control.
But this is very exceptional. In Austria-Hungary, due to the virtual absence of
tides in the Mediterranean, the limit used to be measured from a line, fixed by
the local authorities, where the water ceased to be brackish. It should also be
stated in this connection that tides vary considerably at different times of the
month and year. In a treaty between Spain and Portugal in October, 1893,
low-water mark of spring tides was specified. In English law an ordinary neap
tide is taken. Fulton, pp. 641, 659, 661, 666. Ioon Pdzeril thinks that the limit
of the coast should be fixed at the point on the shore where artillery could be
placed without being endangered by the tides. Des navires de commerce franqais
dans les eaux itrangires, pp. 12o-12I.69See the dispute in 1853 over fishing rights off the Fame Isles. (Fulton, pp.
618, 639-640.) As to neutral rights, the case of The Anna, 5 C. Rob. 373 (18o5),
had decided in favor of reckoning from islands.
EDThe islands off Norway are always considered, at least by Norway herself, as
possessing a territorial value. Recent treaties have specifically mentioned islands
as being entitled to an encircling territorial belt. See, for example, the North Sea
Fishery Convention of 1882; the treaty between Great Britain and Denmark in1901 for the regulation of fishing outside the territorial waters surrounding the
Fare Islands and Iceland; and the Treaty of Peace of Dorpat between Finland
and Russia, October 1, 1920.6 1
"The area of the land on which a strip of littoral sea is dependent is of no
consequence in principle. Guns might be planted on a small island, and we
presume that even in practice an island, without reference to its actual means of
control over the neighboring water, carries the sovereignty over the same width of
the latter all round it as a piece of mainland belonging to the same state would
carry." John Westlake, International Law, Part I, Peace, 2nd ed., p. 19o.
6Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell), in the first case of The Twee Gebroeders,
3 C. Rob. 162, 163 (i8oo), had his doubts, as the following excerpt from the opinion
would indicate: "An exact measurement cannot easily be obtained; but in a case
of this.nature, in which the court would not willingly act with an unfavorable
minuteness towards a neutral state, it will be disposed to calculate the distance
very liberally; and more especially, as the spot in question is a sand covered with
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more liberal. The North Sea Fishery Convention of 1882 mentioned
"dependent islands and banks," and the treaty in igox between
Great Britain and Denmark with regard to Iceland and the Far6e
Islands mentioned "dependent islets, rocks, and banks."6
The question of islands has been made the subject of Article 5 of
the convention drafted by the Committee of Experts for the Pro-
gressive Codification of International Law. For the moment we
shall be concerned with only the first of the two paragraphs into
which the Article is divided. The English translation of the first
paragraph follows:
If there are natural islands, not continuously submerged,
situated off a coast, the inner zone" of the sea shall be measured
from these islands, except in the event of their being so far distant
from the mainland that they would not come within the zone of
the territorial sea if such zone were measured from the mainland.
In such case, the island shall have a special territorial sea for it-
self . 5
The above Article of the convention was originally proposed by
Dr. Walther Schficking, the eminent Rapporteur of the sub-com-
mittee on territorial waters. But Dr. Schficking, I say it with all
respect, has mistaken the purport of the notes he cites in support of
this Article. As it stands, the Article cannot help but prove un-
workable in practice. Dr. Schficking cites the North Sea Fishery
Convention of 1882 to show that the three miles are measured from
the islands along the coast and not from the mainland. And other
water only on the flow of the tide, but immediately connected with the land of
East Friesland, and when dry, may be considered as making part of it." Mr.
T. H. Haynes in i89o declared himself in favor of giving nations territorial juris-
diction for three miles around shoals within a certain depth, say six fathoms, in
order to render the nations responsible for providing lighthouses and buoys.
See his discussion from the floor at the fourteenth conference of the Association for
the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations (now the International Law
Association), p. 200.
6A thorough discussion of banks and rocks may be read in Fulton, pp. 64o-643,
649. It is interesting to note in this connection the anomalous act passed by
Congress in x856, giving the President power to protect the rights of discoverers
of guano on any island, rock, or key, not within the lawful jurisdiction of any
other government, and not occupied by the citizens of any other government.
All acts done on these islets, or in waters adjacent thereto, were to be deemed as
done on the high seas upon a merchant vessel of the United States. See Jones v.
United States, 137 U. S. 202 (1890).
"For "the inner zone" read "the inner line" to correspond with French text.
The French text originally read "la zone int~rieure," but this was corrected to
"la ligne int rieure."
5French text: "Si des iles naturelles, non constamment submerg~es, sont
prdpos~es & une c~te, la ligne intdrieure de la mer sera mesur~e : partir de ces
Iles, except6 le cas ofA des fies seraient 6loign6es du continent de telle mani~re
qu'elles ne se trouveraient plus dans Ia zone de la mer territoriale, si celle-ci
dtait mesurde . partir du continent. Dans ce cas, l'ile a une mer territoriale 2
elle."
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treaties and ordinances are cited as tending to the same effect.
Thus, concludes the Rapporteur, where there is an island, or islands,
not continuously submerged by the sea and not entirely outside of the
regular three-mile line measured from the low-water mark of the
mainland, the three-mile line will be measured from such island, or
islands. But a study of the text of the said Fishery Convention of
1882, of the other treaties cited, and of Thomas W. Fulton, The
Sovereignty of the Sea, pp. 634 et sqq., will show that the purpose of the
said Fishery Convention was merely to guarantee that islands along
the coast would possess a territorial value, that is to say, that each
island would possess a territorial sea around itself. The framers of
the Convention of 1882 desired to lay at rest the doubts existing at
that period as to whether coastal islands (and banks that became
islands when the tide was out) had any territorial belt at all. Con-
sequently, they stated in the Convention that, "The fishermen of
each country shall enjoy the exclusive right of fishery within the
distance of 3 miles from low-water mark along the whole extent of the
coasts of their respective countries, as well as of the dependent islands
and banks." (Italics mine.)
At that period (1882) it was generally conceded that an island in the
middle of the high seas possessed a territorial belt, but it was far
from clear whether an island, falling wholly or partially within the
territorial belt measured from the mainland, should have any extra
consideration given to it, by reckoning a three-mile belt from such
portions of its shores as would guarantee to it throughout its circum-
ference a protective zone three miles in width. Consequently, the
above provision was inserted in the Fishery Convention of 1882.
Dr. Shficling does not expressly indicate how it is proposed to
delimit the line from an island, or islands, located wholly or partially
within the three-mile zone as counted from the mainland. It appears
certain that the Article seeks to effect some change in the existing law.
The existing law is very simple, namely, that every island has a three-
mile zone around its shores. Thus, by existing law, where islands
happen to lie within the three-mile zone measured from the mainland,
the three-mile zone around each island would fall partly within and
partly without the three-mile zone measured from the mainland.
Of course, the portion of the island's zone that falls within the zone
measured from the mainland does not change the legal status of the
waters of the latter zone, because such are territorial already; but
the rest of the island's zone, falling outside of the mainland's zone,
adds to the sum total of the state's territorial waters.
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But inasmuch as the Article of the draft convention under dis-
cussion distinguishes between an island inside and outside of the
three-mile zone measured from the mainland, expressly endowing an
outside island with "a special territorial sea for itself," it is to be
assumed that a new method of delimitation is recommended for
islands situated three miles or less from the mainland.
One possible interpretation that might be given to the Article as it
stands is, that where islands are located within three miles of the
mainland, the line to separate the high from the territorial sea shall be
drawn three miles from the outermost island and shall follow the
sinuosities of the mainland. (If the line were not to follow the main-
land but to follow the sinuosities of the islands, the Article would not
effect any change in the law; but a change of some kind was intended,
as we have seen). But the difficulty with this interpretation is how
the line shall ever return to three miles from the mainland. Once the
line begins to follow the sinuosities of the mainland at a distance of
three miles from an island, how and where shall the line drop back to
three miles from the coast of the mainland?
The only other possible interpretation that this Article could
receive is that it is meant to adopt the Scandinavian method. of
delimitation.6 If this is the intention, the Article should be rendered
more specific in its terms, and describe how the connecting base line
is to be drawn from outermost island to outermost island and how all
the sea is to be territorial for three miles seaward from the base
line.
It would seem rather unwise to alter the present general practice of
delimitation as radically as this Article apparently does. All that
should be stated in the draft convention in respect to islands is, that
all natural islands in the sea not thereby constantly submerged shall
possess a territorial zone of three miles measured from low-water mark
of an ordinary neap tide. 7
Let us now consider the second paragraph of Article 5. This
reads as follows:
In the case of archipelagos, the constituent islands are con-
sidered as forming a whole and the width of the territorial sea
shall be measured from the islands most distant from the center
of the archipelago. 6
OThe Scandinavian system is described supra, p. 460, n. 28.67 f the Article in question does not intend to change the existing law, it should
be revised to conform therewith in unambiguous language.68French text: "S'il s'agit d'un archipel, les iles qui le constituent seront
consid6r~es comme formant n ensemble, et l'tendue de la mer territoriale sera
comptde it partir des Iles les plus 6loign~es du centre de l'archipel."
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This provision is borrowed from a draft project submitted by
M. Alejandro Alvarez to the Stockholm meeting of the International
Law Association in 1924.69 On the surface, the provision seems a
happy one, but on second thought, grave doubts arise. I should
venture to suggest, despite the high source of this paragraph, that it
adds only confusion to the general law of territorial waters. An
archipelago is a general and somewhat vague conception; can anyone
say where an archipelago begins and ends, or fix its center? If the
archipelago is a dense one with numerous islands, a three-mile belt
around each individual island will give virtually the same result,
namely, that the waters of the archipelago as a whole will be territo-
rial. If there should, however, be some high sea between more
distant islands, no harm is done. The effort to codify the law of
territorial waters should never lose sight of the principle of the free-
dom of the seas, and one should be twice careful before making
territorial those waters that stand to-day as high seas. Furthermore,
there has been no long demand, historically speaking, of a special
rule for an archipelago. M. Alvarez seems to be the first to have urged
one. And the vagueness of the term "archipelago" contributes a new
subject for debate to the field of territorial waters, where the need is
urgent for fewer such subjects. And what of the case where two or
more governments possess islands in the same archipelago?
Closely related to the question of rocks and islands is the status of
lighthouses built on piles or rocks. Thought on this subject has some-
times been confused.70 Strictly, it is not the lighthouse that is im-
69M. Alvarez' provision also appeared later in Project No. 1O (Art. 7) of the
Codification of American International Law, as follows: "In case of an archipelago,
the islands and keys composing it shall be considered as forming a unit and the
extent of territorial sea referred to in Article 5 shall be measured from the islands
farthest from the center of the archipelago." This Project No. io is one of several
prepared at the request on January 2, 1924, of the Governing Board of the Pan
American Union for the consideration of the International Commission of Jurists,
and submitted by the American Institute of Internationfal Law to the Governing
Board of the Pan American Union, March 2, 1925.
7OSir Charles Russell in his argument before the tribunal in the Behring Sea
controversy claimed complete territorial rights for a lighthouse built on piles
or rocks even beyond the territorial waters proper of the littoral state. (J. B.
Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United
States has been a Party, I, 9oo-9o). Paul Fauchille agrees with Sir Charles
Russell. (Paul Fauchille, Trait6 de droit international public, Vol. 1, Pt. 2, Peace,
p. 530). But Oppenheim and Westlake deny that lighthouses rank above light-
ships and argue against a territorial sea. (L. Oppenheim, International Law,
3rd ed., I, 341. John Westlake, International Law, Part I, Peace, 2nd ed., p. 19o).
Sir Graham Bower, on the other hand, would not refuse even a lightship a terri-
torial belt, at least for neutrality purposes. (Sir Graham Bower, "Territorial
Waters," Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, 3rd series,
5925, Vol. VII, pp. 137-141). In a recent American case, a beacon, built on an
entirely submerged reef, was held to have no territorial value. United States v.
Henning, 7 F. (2d) 488 (1925).
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portant for territorial purposes, but the foundation. If the latter is
natural, to the extent that any natural part of it is exposed at low
tide, then such exposed land is entitled to a territorial sea. It would
be entitled to such a belt in the absence of the lighthouse, provided it
was not res nullius. But if the foundation is wholly artificial, it is
not entitled to a belt. A nation should not be permitted to create
maritime zones in the ocean by erecting at will artificial objects pro-
jecting above the water. Nor should a state in theory be allowed to
enjoy an increased territorial zone consequent upon any artificial
extension of the mainland. The general subject has probablybeen
sufficiently dealt with by the Committee of Experts by specifying
"natural islands" in Article 5 of the convention. 71
The next problem in the delimitation of territorial waters is that
of bays. The fundamental question here is whether a bay should be
treated as a special case, or whether the general three-mile limit,
should be applied around the shores within the bay. In the first
place, what is a bay? The name bay has been given to bodies of
water ranging from a mile square in area to hundreds of thousands of
miles square. Again, the name gulf or sea may be given to a body of
water smaller in extent than some so-called bay. Hence, it is evident
that names and area do not aid in defining a bay. About all that can
be said with certainty by way of definition is that a bay is a body of
water indenting land and forming a part of some larger body of
water. 72
Self-defense may have been the original motive for placing bays
upon a special basis. Sovereign states undoubtedly considered it
awkward, as well as dangerous, to have foreign warships enter the
local harbors and bays. Then, too, a bay deeply indenting the land,
especially if the entrance from the open sea was narrow, seemed by
nature herself placed upon a different footing from the high seas.
Such an arm of the ocean invited the exercise of sovereign power;
such a bay seemed like a part of the very realm itself.73 Thus, from
7'Quoted supra, p. 469.
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'Even if it be granted that bays are territorial under International Law, the
definition of the term 'bay,' and the question at what point a bay ceases to be a
bay, are amongst the thorniest and knottiest problems which the internationaljurist has to tackle." Ludovic J. Grant, "The King's Chambers," 31 LawQuarterly Review, 4iL-42o, at p. 420 (1915).
73Lord Advocate v. Trustees of the Clyde Navigation, 19 Court of Session
Rep., 4th series, p. 174 (1891). Paul Fauchille distinguishes between the juris-
diction over bays and over ports, holding that in the case of the former, the three-
mile limit always applies, in the absence of treaty, around the shores within the
bay regardless of the extent of the opening towards the sea, and holding that in
the case of ports, full and complete jurisdiction, equivalent to dominum, exists
over all the waters. This distinction, he contends, is justified because bays are
the creation of nature, but ports the work of man. As for myself, I find it im-
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the earliest times many bays were regarded by municipal law as
lying within the body of the nation and therefore completely subject
to local jurisdiction.7 4 The first rough standard employed to deter-
mine whether a given bay constituted a part of the realm was the
extent of vision from headland to headland. Hale stated the rule
thus: "That arm or branch of the sea which lies within the fauces
terrae, where a man may reasonably discern between shore and shore,
is, or at least may be, within the body of a county."7  East,7 6 how-
ever, and Coke77 held the rule to be "where a man standing on the
side of the land may see what is done on the other." All these writers
refer for their ultimate source to a case in 1314 or 1315 given in
Fitzherbert's Abridgement.78 Hale's statement is an inaccurate para-
phrase from Fitzherbert79 The original rule, then, as cited by Fitz-
herbert, was that an arm of the sea lay within the county when a man
standing on one shore could see what was being done on the other.80
This rule has been correctly applied in several well-known American
cases.81 But the standard of vision for bays is open to all the ob-
possible to agree with Fauchille in his distinction. First, ports are often not
the work of man but are natural in every sense of the word. In many ports,
excavation has been unnecessary to their complete utilization. Moreover, one
could hardly determine by any rule of law the amount of manual labor necessary
to raise a bay to the status of a port. Second, the adjudicated cases make no
distinction between bays and ports, and hold both to form part of the realm
provided their configuration will so warrant. Third, if a distinction were at-
tempted, it would prove awkward in practice, because ships frequent both bays
and ports for objects of trade; to distinguish between the two would require in
each case the exercise of an arbitrary will. Fauchille advances his arguments
in his Traiti de droit international public, Vol. I, Pt. 2, Peace, p. 387-395.74The historical question of the King's Chambers, although related to the
problem of bays, has little in common therewith. The doctrine of the King's
Chambers, by which in 1604, vast tracts of the ocean were subjected to English
sovereignty by means of lines connecting the outermost headlands of England at
whatever distance apart, was in reality merely anothermethod under different
guise of appropriating the high seas.7  MSir atthew Hale, Dejure maris et brachiorum ejusdem, Ch. IV.
76Edward Hyde East, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, Ch. XVII, § 1o.
"Sir Edward Coke, Reports, Pt. XII, p. 81; Pt. XIII, p. 52.
78Sir Anthony Fitzherbert, La Graunde Abridgement, "Corone & plees del
corone," 399. A search through the Year Books of Edward II, as edited for the
Selden Society, does not reveal this case, decided by Hervey of Stanton, Justice
of the Common Bench.79Thomas Jefferson fell into the same error. Jefferson to the Secretary of the
Treasury, Sept. 8, 1804. P. L. Ford, The Writings of Tlwmas Jefferson, VIII,
319. (Cited by Crocker, p. 641).8 Western Australia, according to Mr. T. H. Haynes, has advanced claim to all
bays, the headlands of which are in sight of each other, thus following Hale's
error. A. H. Charteris, "Claims of Territorial Jurisdiction in Wide Bays," 16
Yale Law Journal, 471-496, at pp. 479-480 (1907). The whole rule of vision
as to bays was frowned upon in Direct United States Cable Co. v. Anglo-American
Telegraph Co., [1877] 2 App. Cas. 394.8 United States v. Grush, 5 Mason's Rep. (U. S. C. C. A.) 290 (1829); Common-
wealth v. Peters, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 387 (1847); Dunham v. Lamphere, 3 Gray(Mass.) 268 (1855).
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jections urged against it for the open coast. 8 Consequently, a fixed
geographical distance has frequently been incorporated in modem
treaties as being more satisfactory," and this policy is adopted by the
Committee of Experts in Article 4 of the draft convention in the
following terms:
In the case of bays which are bordered by the territory of a
single State, the territorial sea shall follow the sinuosities of the
coast, except that it shall be measured from a straight line drawn
across the bay at the part nearest to the opening towards the sea
where the distance between the two shores of the bay is ten
marine miles,8 unless a greater distance has been established
by continuous and immemorial usage. The waters of such bays
are to be assimilated to internal waters.
In the case of bays which are bordered by the territory of twoor
more States, the territorial sea shall follow the sinuosities of the
coast. u
The above principle of ten-mile bays is not without its difficulties.
Certain bays present a narrow entrance, ten miles or less in width, but
then spread into a vast sea. 8 Is such a sea to form part of the realm?
If a single nation occupied all the shores of the Black Sea, as was once
the case, should the latter be considered as part of that nation merely
because of the narrow entrance from the Mediterranean? Another
difficulty arises when islands are situated in the mouth of a bay.
Suppose one large island in a bay eleven miles from headland to
headland; suppose the island leaves only two very narrow channels,
one on each side, by which ships can enter the bay. Is the bay
nSee above, p. 467.
8North Sea Fishery Convention of 1882; convention between Great Britain
and Denmark, June 24, i9oi, for regulating the fisheries outside territorial waters
in the ocean surrounding the Far6e Islands and Iceland; agreement between the
United States and Great Britain in 1912 adopting, with certain modifications,
the rules and method of procedure recommended in the award of September 7,
igio, of the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration; etc. See further, A. H.
Charteris, "The Seaward Limit of Territorial Jurisdiction," 18 Juridical Reieu,
288-292, at p. 291 (1906). Also see note in Journal of t7 Society of Comparative
Legislation and International Law, n. s., Vol. 18, p. 304 (1918).
84May I suggest the phrase "does not exceed ten marine miles" instead of "is
ten marine miles"? Otherwise, the text of the Article would seem to r6fuse a line
of closure where the distance between the outer headlands is less than ten miles.
"French text: "Pour les baies, qui sont environndes de terres d'un seul Etat,
ia mer territoriale suit les sinuositds de la cte, sauf qu'elle est mesurde & partir
d'une ligne droite tir~e en travers de la baie, dans la partie la plus rapprochde
de l'ouverture vers la mer, o t l'dcart entre les deux c~tes de la baie est de io
milles marins de largeur, I moins qu'un usage continu et sdculaire n'ait consacrd
une largeur plus grande. Les eaux de ces baies sont i assimiler . des eaux intari-
eures.
"Pour les baies, qui sont efivironnes de terres de deux ou plusieurs Etats, la
mer territoriale suit les sinuositds de la c~te."
8gFor example, the Zuyder Zee.
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territorial, and if so, what is the base line from which to calculate the
outer territorial seas7
Little help is to be derived from a study of the cases, which only
add to the prevailing confusion. Edmund Randolph in 1793 in the
case of the ship Grange held that Delaware Bay was territorial be-
cause the United States was the only nation controlling theshores.88
In 1866, Long Island Sound was held territorial because cannon
planted on the fauces terrae could control the eastern entrance. The
islands at the eastern extremity of the Sound were held to be the
fauces terrae.89 Again, prescription and jurisdiction exercised for a
long period of time have served as bases for territorial claims to
bays.9 0 In x885, the unsatisfactory precedent of the Grange in
Delaware Bay was partly relied upon in the case of the Alleganean in
the Chesapeake.91
Still another difficulty is the question of "bays" that are only
slightly concave. When the coast for miles slowly bends in like a
wide bow, but the bend is so gradual as to be almost imperceptible,
is an infinite series of ten-mile base lines to be drawn in the bosom
of the bow, despite the fact that the coast in question presents none of
the normal characteristics of a bay? Moreover, is every little break
in the shore-line to constitute a bay and warrant a base line across its
headlands? It would seem that to hold either small breaks or wide
and shallow concavities to be bays within the meaning of the rule,
would amount in most instances to a nullification of the common law
principle of low-water on the open coast. The solution would best be
87An island situated at the mouth of a bay has at least twice in American cases
been deemed to be the opposite shore. United States v. Grush, 5 Mason's Rep.
290 (1829); Mahler v. Transportation Co., 35 N. Y. 352 (x866).
8"The corner-stone of our claim is that the United States are proprietors of
the lands on both sides of the Delaware from its head to its entrance into the
sea." i Op. Att. Gen. 32, 34. But this is no reason; it amounts to more than
fiat.
81Mahler v. Transportation Co., supra, n. 87.
90Conception Bay: see Direct United States Cable Co. v. Anglo-American
Telegraph Co., [1877] 2 App. Cas. 394. Long Island Sound: see Mahler v.Transportation Co., supa, at p. 360. As to prescription, Dana has the following
to say: "But, however long acquiesced in, such an appropraton inadmissible,
in the nature of things; and, whatever may be the evidence of the time or nature
of the use, it is set aside as a bad usage, which no evidence can make legal....
And it may be said to be now r-es adjudiata, that the only question is whether a
given sea or sound is in fact, as a matter of politico-physical geography, within
the exclusive jurisdiction of one nation." Note 1I3 to Wheaton's Elements of
International La . The doctrine of prescription or immemorial usage is recognized
by the Committee of Experts in Article 4, quoted above in the text.
O'Stetson v. United States, Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, 32
Albany Law journal 484 (1885). Long usage was also much relied upon.
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left in the hands of each court passing on the merits of the particular
case.12
The chief remaining difficulty concerns a situation where two or
more nations border on the same bay, which otherwise would be
territorial.93 In such a case the ten-mile rule, resulting in donminium
"At least two methods of deciding this question have been suggested by writers.
Professor George Grafton Wilson of Harvard has proposed the following legal
definition of a bay: "Bays are bodies of water extending into the land a distance
greater than that between the opposite shores when the opposite shores are not
more than ten miles distant from each other."-Article ii of his draft in the
Report of Proceedings of the Third Annual Meeting of the American Branch of
the International Law Association, (1924), p. i6. Cf. Rom~e de Villeneuve,
De la ditermination de la ligne separative des eaux nationales et dela merterritoriale
spcialement duns les baies, p. 242. Sir John W. Salmond suggests that "the true
doctrine as to enclosed territorial waters is that all harbours, bays, gulfs, and
estuaries are included within and form part of the adjacent territory if, having
regard to their size and configuration in relation to that territory, it is reasonable
to presume an intention on the part of the Crown or the legislature, as the case
may be, in annexing the territory or in constituting it as a dependency of the
Crown, to include those waters as part of that territory or dependency." Sir
John W. Salmond, "Territorial Waters," 34 Law Quarterly Review, 235-252,
at p. 248 (1918). The Hague Tribunal in i9io in the North Atlantic Coast
Fisheries Case expressed itself asfollows: "This interest varies, speaking generally,
in proportion to the penetration inland of the bay; but as no principle of inter-
national law recognizes any specified relation between the concavity of the bay
and the requirements for control by the territorial sovereignty, this Tribunal is
unable to qualify by the application of any new principle its interpretation of the
Treaty of i8I8 as excluding bays in general from the strict and systematic applica-
tion of the three mile rule." George Grafton Wilson, Tie Hague Arbitration
Cases, p. 182.
13See Salvador R. Gonzdles, "The Neutrality of Honduras and the Question of
the Gulf of Fonseca," The American Journal of International Law, io:5o9-542
(1916). See case of the schooner Fame, 3 Mason's Rep. 147 (1822), where Story,
J., -employed the principle of the thalweg in Passamaquoddy Bay, on which both
Canada and the United States bordered. See also the case of Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua, The American Journal of International Law, I1:,81-229 (1917).
Another problem of some importance concerns the delimitation of territorial waters
in the vicinity of the point on the shore at the termination of the land boundary
of two adjoining states. It is obvious that a ship at a given time might be within
three miles of the coast of both states. The solution would seem to be that the
vessel should be considered in the territorial waters of the state whose coast it is
nearer. For a discussion of this problem, consult Dr. Desz6 D6rday, "Notes
upon the Question of the Delimitation of Territorial Waters," International Law
Association, 25th Report, I9o8, pp. 547-556. An interesting decision in this
connection was handed down by the Conseil des Prises in France, October 19,
1916. The Greek vessel Zoodochos-Pighi, seized by the French, August 31, 1915,
in the canal of Chios at a less distance from the Turkish isle of Koumouthi, than
from the coast of Chios occupied by the Greeks, was deemed to be in Turkish,
and therefore enemy, waters. Paul Fauchille, La guerre de X914. Jurisprudencefran~aise en matire de prises maritimes, p. 313. Still another question is the
status of waters at the mouth of a boundary river. Manuel Roldan has treated
this subject and shown the undesirability of the principle of the thalweg at the
mouths of rivers like the Guadiana and Minho between Spain and Portugal,
where the depth of the channel varies, navigation being forced first near one bank
and then near the other. He argues in favor of a community of dominion over the
mouths of boundary rivers, each state to appoint members on a joint committee
to have charge of navigation at the mouth. See his paper in the Association inter-
nationale de la marine, Congrhs de Lisbonne, 1904, pp. 314-317. See also, in
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over the bay, would be inappropriate, because each state must by
necessity have the right of innocent passage within the bay as against
the other state or states. Since the right of passage is incompatible
with the theory of dominium, it follows that these waters must be
regarded as on a parity with any outer territorial zone, and this fact is
recognized by the Committee of Experts in Article 4 quoted above.
It would seem, however, that in the case of secondary bays (i. e., a
bay, indenting a single nation, within a bay, on which one or more
other nations border), the rule of dominium would be applicable,
unless ships from the sea could not have access to one of the nations
except by navigating the secondary bay.94
In concluding this section on the delimitation of territorial waters,
it is necessary to say a few words on the troublesome topics of straits
and river mouths. If a strait is more than six miles wide throughout
its length, a strip of high sea would ordinarily be deemed to run along
the middle. If, on the other hand, the strait, in whole or in part, is
less than six miles across, and the opposite shores are occupied by
different nations, the principle either of the thalweg or of the ligne
mediane would apply, and a vessel would be deemed in the territorial
waters of either nation, depending on which side of the thalweg or
ligne mi iane it was navigating or was at anchor. But practice is not
uniform. In the Strait of Fuca, the boundary between Canada and
the United States is carried across a space of water thirty-five miles
long and twenty miles wide, and then extends for fifty miles down a
strait fifteen miles wide to the Pacific.9 5 If the opposite shores of a
strait less than six miles across are held by the same nation, it would
seem that such strait, nevertheless, could not be considered as part of
this connection, Ernest Nys, "Rivi&res et fleuves frontires.-La ligne m6diane
et le thalweg. Un apergu historique," Revue de droit international et de l6gislation
comparfe, 33:75-88 (19Ol).940n the general subject of bays, see, in addition to the works already cited,
Charles Noble Gregory, "The Recent Controversy as to the British Jurisdiction
over Foreign Fishermen more than Three Miles from Shore: Mortensen v.
Peters," The American Political Science Review, 1:410-437 (907). L. Oppenheim,
"Zur Lehre von den territorialen Meerbusen," Zeitschrift fur Vdlkerrecht und
Bundessftatsrecht, 1:579-587 (1907). A. H. Charteris, "Recent International
Disputes Regarding Territorial Bays," International Law Association, 27th
Report, 1912, pp. 107-127. P. T. McGrath, "The Hudson Bay Dispute," The
Fortnightly Review, n.s., 83:125-136 (19o8). Thomas W. Balch, "Is Hudson Bay
a Closed or an Open Sea?" The American Journal of International Law, 6:409-459
(1912). Same author, "The Hudsonian Sea is a Great Open Sea," Ibid., 7:546-565(1913). Same author, "The Legal Status of Hudson's Bay," The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 45:47-55 (1913). Sir CecilJ. B.
Hurst, "The Territoriality of Bays," The British Year Book of International Law,
1922-23, pp. 42-54. Anon., "Territorial Jurisdiction in Wide Bays," 41 American
Law Review, 743-746 (1907). Anon., "United States Rights in British Bays," 31
Canadian Law Times, 289-298 (1911).95By the arbitral award of the German Emperor in 1873. W. E. Hall, A Treatise
on International Law, 8th ed., pp. 195-196.
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the realm, like a bay, unless it is merely the entrance to a basin serving
as a bay, which is also surrounded by the territory of the Power
controlling the' shores of the strait.96 On the other hand, if two or
more Powers border on such inland basin or bay, and the shores of
the strait forming a narrow entrance thereto are entirely controlled
by one nation, this nation has no right to shut the strait. In such a
situation, the strait would be on the same basis as outer territorial sea.
A fortiori a strait would be like outer territorial sea if connecting two
high seas, for the reason that it would constitute a maritime highway
and be subject to the right of innocent passage. 97 This right, of
course, is conditioned upon the observance of reasonable regulations
made by the littoral state, and the commission of no hostilities while
in the neutral waters.99
The sixth Article of the draft convention of the Committee of
Experts treats of the r6gime of straits. It reads as follows:
The r~gime of straits at present subject to special conventions
is reserved. In straits of which both shores belong to the same
State, the sea shall be territorial, even if the distance between
the shores exceeds ten miles, provided that that distance is not
exceeded at either entrance to the strait.
Straits not exceeding ten miles in width whose shores belong to
different States shall form part of the territorial sea as far as the
middle line.99
This Article is evidently drawn to correspond with the Article
on bays, in that the ten-mile rule is carried over and applied to
straits. There would seem slight objection to this if it were not for
doubts as to the status of waters between a large island and the main-
land. Such narrows, any atlas will show, are time and again denom-
inated straits; and if the proposed ten-mile rule were applied, the
9sjohn Westlake, International Law, Part I, Peace, 2nd ed., p. 197.
7G. de Rayneval, Institutions du droit de la nature, I, 298.
980n the question of straits, see M. le Comte de Penha Garcia, "Rdgime des
d6troits et des canaux maritimes," Union Interparlementaire. Compte-rendu de
la XVIIIe Conference tenue h La Haye du 3 au 5 septembre 1913, pp. 51-89,
175-192. J. G. Guerra, "Les eaux territoriales dans les d6troits sp~cialement
dans les d"troits peu larges," Revue gnerale de droit international public, s1:
Pa23-254 (924). J.M. Abribat, Le ditroit de Magellan a point vue inern 
a
ParIS, 9t2. Rudolf Edler von Lati, Die Internationalisierung 
der Meerengen und
Kandle. The Hague, 1918. Ernest Nys, Le droit international, Vol. 1, Ch. V.
Brussels and Paris, 1904. Paul Godey, La iner c~tigre, pp. 26-34. Paris, 1896.
Paul Fauchille, Traitg de droit international public, Vol. 1, Pt. 2, Peace, pp. 246-
285. Paris, 1925.99French text: "Le regime des d~troits, actuellenient souruis ii des conventions
sp~ciales, demeure r~servd. Dans les d~troits dont les c~tes appartiennent au
mame Etat, la mer est territorinle, bien que l'6cartement des cbtes d6passe
io milles, si, b chaque entr6e du d6troit, cette distance n'est pas ddpass6e.
"Les d6troits, dont 1'dcart n'excbde pas io milles et dont les c6tes appartiennent
h des Etats diff6rents, font partie de lamer territoriale jusqu'A la ligne mdiane."
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anomalous situation would develop of all waters between an island
and the mainland being held territorial when the nearest shores of the
island are perhaps ten miles from the mainland. Thus, the terms of
Article 5 dealing with islands would be contradicted. The shore of the
island in question would lie seven miles beyond the zone of sovereignty
measured from the mainland, and yet all the intermediate waters by
Article 6 would be considered territorial. In view of these consider-
ations, it would seem advisable to substitute six miles for ten miles in
Article 6.
The last problem we shall consider is that of river mouths, or
embouchures.10 Only a few general observations, limited to national
rivers, will be made concerning this intricate question.' 01
It is rare to find the banks of a river parallel to the end and cutting
more or less of a right angle with the coast; generally a river spreads,
and the mouth resembles the configuration of a bay. If, however, a
river retains its parallel banks when it empties into the ocean, and at
the same time the headlands are more than ten miles apart, the
question is presented, where does the river end, and how far, if at
all, may the sea be said to penetrate. If such a river empties into a
territorial bay, then there is no difficulty, for it is all part of the realm,
for international purposes. But where such a river empties into the
sea on the open coast, a problem of jurisdiction at once comes up,
because the outer territorial sea, according to generally accepted
doctrine, does not form part of the realm. In such a case, which
admittedly would be extremely rare, it would undoubtedly be held that
the river was a river to the end, no matter what its width at the
mouth; and a line from headland to headland would separate the
dominium of the river from the imperium of the outer territorial sea.
Take the more common case of a river parallel to the end, but less
than ten miles wide at the mouth, and emptying into the sea on the
open coast. Here the river is river to the end, and a line from head-
land to headland would mark the jurisdictions, as in the case of the
river more than ten miles wide.
Take now the ordinary case of a river spreading its shores into the
form of a bay. The bay should be treated like other bays, and if de-
termined to be territorial, it follows that everything landward from
the line of closure is territorial.
100There is no Article on this subject in the draft convention.
'
01In regard to international rivers, see G. Kaeckenbeeck, International Rivers.
Grotius Society Publications, No. I. London, 1918. See also, Report on Danube
Navigation Submitted to the Advisory and Technical Committee for Communica-
tions and Transit of the League of Nations, by Walker D. Hines. Geneva, Aug.
20, 1925.
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One possible case remains. The parallelism of the banks of the
river is interrupted, and there is presented a wide expanse of water in
the shape of a basin or lake, and then the parallelism is resumed to the
outer sea. In this case, if the second parallel state is at all reasonable
in length, the stream is a river throughout, for international pur-
poses, regardless of the salinity of the water in the basin, the presence
of tides, or the nature of the vegetation on the shores.'92
10A suggestive article on the subject is by IAon Aucoc, "De la d6limitation du
rivage de la mer et de l'embouchure des fleuves et rivi&res," Annales d c I'&ole
libre des sciences politiques, 2: 1-36 (1887).
